US national security strategy is on life support

Most people turn off when they hear terms like "national security strategy." In some ways, this rather esoteric use of language is purposely made obscure so that only so-called “experts” can debate and talk or write about it.  

But national security affects all of us and thus must be of great concern.

Since the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War, national security strategy rested on three simple principles. The first was a strong economy; the second was a system of alliances and allies determined to defend themselves against a common enemy — in the first instance, the Soviet Union. Third, and especially in a thermonuclear age when war could be existential to society, the capability to deter conflict.  

Left unsaid was what would be needed to fight and win a world war, assuming winning were possible.

These basic principles made great sense. And while many lesser wars and conflicts were fought and not deterred around the world, world war between the West and the Soviet Union was prevented.  

Some believe that it was the military might of the U.S. and its allies that was responsible when, in fact, the irrational nature of the Soviet system could not be sustained. When Mikhail Gorbachev took the reins of power in 1986, he attempted to reform and modernize his country through perestroika(restructuring) and glasnost (openness).

Instead, the brittle system could not withstand any external pressure for change, and imploded in 1989. 

The collapse raised a profound challenge for the U.S. and the West. Would the new Russia be capable of becoming a Western democracy and ally? And if yes, what were the policies to accomplish that aim? 

Nearly 40 years since the USSR was dissolved, the answer was clear: "Nyet!"

In U.S. strategy, Russia has become the “acute” threat and China the “pacing” threat. The problem is that neither word fits. 

"Acute" can mean “dire,” “dreadful” or “terrible.” It also means “sharp,” “shrewd” or “astute.” "Pacing" means doing everything in moderation. 

Hence, it is not surprising that, from ill-defined danger, the subsequent strategy is flawed.  

The current National Defense Strategy, relatively unchanged from the original Obama administration’s 2014 version, is meant to compete, deter and, if war comes, prevail against a range of potential adversaries topped by China and Russia. That, in turn, raises a series of crucial questions.

In terms of competition, how is that measured and on what basis? None have been defined. If it is economic, Russia simply cannot compete. China can, but which factors make up the pacing threat?

Regarding deterrence, what is actually being deterred? China has not been swayed from expanding its influence, threatening Taiwan and building an impressive navy, at least on paper. Russia was not deterred from seizing Crimea in 2014 or invading Ukraine three years ago, as well as threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

Should war come, it could involve using thermonuclear and nuclear weapons. A thermonuclear weapon, by definition, is 1,000 times greater than a nuclear one. Who would win a thermonuclear or nuclear war? The likely answer is no one.

An intelligent person would ask, “Can we do better than this?” 

That means identifying exactly what the threats are and deriving a strategy far better defined than the ambiguous terms “compete,” “deter” and “defeat.” That means starting from first principles and understanding exactly what threat China or Russia poses before moving to the strategy for countering it.

I have long argued that the major danger facing us comes from “Massive Attacks of Disruption and Destruction," whether wrought by man or nature. In both cases, prevention rather than deterrence is necessary. It's unlikely to stave off an attack that an enemy regards as inevitable, and nearly impossible to deter a pandemic, catastrophic storm or earthquake. 

Whether Massive Attacks of Disruption and Destruction fits or not, a construct like it is needed now. Regarding the three bases for strategy, the Trump administration’s tariff and tax policies are imposing great damage on the economy. Alliances are being eroded by America First policies. And we’re not deterring anything. 

This calls for a fundamental review of national security and strategy. Yet, the likelihood of a truly first principles approach in the current exceedingly toxic political environment is nil. 

The crucial question is whether this nation is capable of such an effort. And on that, our collective future may rest.

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a senior advisor at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council, the chairman of two private companies and the principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. He and David Richards are authors of the forthcoming book, “The Arc of Failure: Can Decisive Strategic Thinking Transform a Dangerous World.”